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INTRODUCTION

Identity-based key exchanges have obvious advantages over
PKI based key exchanges, since the participants do not
Copyright c 200x Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
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require public key certificates. The concept of identitybased cryptography was introduced by Shamir (1984). In
the identity-based cryptography, users can choose an arbitrary string, such as email address and IP number, as
their public key, and the corresponding private key is created by binding the identity string with a master secret of
a trusted authority called Key Generation Centre (KGC).
Many identity-based key agreement schemes were based
on Shamir’s identity-based notion. Introduction of paring
cryptography by Sakai et al. (2000) opened up an entirely
new field for identity-based cryptography. Since then,
many novel identity-based key agrement protocols from
pairings have been introduced (Smart (2002); Shim (2003);
Chen et al. (2007); McCullagh and Barreto (2005); Xie
(2005); Boyd and Choo (2005); Chow and Choo (2007)).
Key agreement protocols should satisfy some basic security properties, for example, known-key security, forward
security, unknown-key share resilience, key-compromise
impersonate resilience and no key control. The known security models usually cover all of the above security attributes except the forward security.
In a key agreement protocol, two or more participants
can generate a shared session key by making use of their
long-term keys and ephemeral messages exchanged over an
open network. The shared secret session key is then used
for secure communication. Forward secrecy (fs) is one of
the most important attributes of the authenticated key
agreement protocol. Under this assumption, disclosure of
a long-term private key(s) does not affect the secrecy of
previous session keys established by honest participants.
It can be considered as three cases from different levels:

from a cyclic group. These protocols are more efficient
compared to those based on the key extraction algorithm,
where the private key of the user is a product of the master key and a point in the group of an elliptic curve Sakai
et al. (2000). There are quite a few schemes (Cheng et al.
(2004); Chen et al. (2007); Xie (2004); Choo (2005)) that
are based on MB protocols. The original security of MB
protocols are reduced to the Bilinear Inverse Diffie Hellmam (BIDH) problem in a weaker security model where
the reveal query is disallowed in random oracle. Therefore, Cheng and Chen (2007) attempted to improve the
proof of the MB protocols by introducing a new security
assumption called k-Bilinear Collision Attack Assumption
(k-BCAA1), which is the variant of k-Bilinear Inverse Diffie
Hellmam (k-BIDH) assumption, and reducing the security
of MB protocols to the Gap k-Bilinear Collision Attack Assumption (Gap-k-BCAA1) assumption. After that, Chen
et al. (2007) introduced a build-in function to reduce the
security of an enhanced MB protocol to a computational
assumption. The security model they used has no limitation to the reveal query.
McCullagh and Barreto’s first protocols (MB-1) are vulnerable to key compromise impersonation attack according
to Xie (2004). They later provided a variant of the protocols (MB-2) to eliminate this weakness. Unfortunately,
the perfect forward secrecy and the master key forward
secrecy are lost.
In order to improve MB-1 to resist the key compromise
impersonation attack, Xie (2005) introduced a signature
to the protocol. However, it does not accommodate the
master key forward secrecy. We observe that signature is
undesirable to fix MB-1 protocol since the cost of signature is expensive, and most importantly, master key forward secrecy cannot be achieved using a signature. In the
case that the attacker knows the master key, then he can
compute all users’ private keys which are used to produce
the signatures, thus obtain some useful information which
could lead to the final session secrets. We will utilize Xie’s
protocol to explain this case. Therefore, in order to improve MB protocols to satisfy all basic security properties,
we will enhance MB-2 so that it can catch the master key
forward secrecy.
A typical approach to improve the MB-2 protocol so that
it can capture the master key forward secrecy is to add the
Diffie-Hellman (DH) key computation into the session key,
using the key extraction algorithm of Sakai et al. (2000), as
proposed in Chen and Kudla (2003); Yuan and Li (2005).
However, the key tokens provided by the participants in
the MB-2 protocol are computed with different bases. We
observe that integrating the ephemeral secret key and a
public parameter which is accessible to both parties can
subsequently add an extra DH key exchange in the key
tokens. This operation allows us to compute the DH key
and capture forward secrecy, including the perfect forward
secrecy and the master key forward secrecy.

• Partial forward secrecy (s-fs): Compromising some
but not all of the entities’ long-term keys does not
disclose previously established session keys;
• Perfect forward secrecy (d-fs): Compromising all entities’ long-term keys does not disclose previously established session keys;
• Master key forward secrecy (m-fs): Compromising
long-term key of the key generation center does not
affect the secrecy of the previously session keys. This
is a particular property in the identity-based systems
and it implies perfect forward secrecy.

Most of the identity-based key agreement protocols satisfy
the partial forward secrecy, however, only few of them satisfy the perfect forward secrecy and the master key forward
secrecy.
McCullagh and Barreto (2005) presented two identitybased authenticated key agreement protocols (MB protocols for short) in 2005: with key escrow and without key
escrow (Here we only focus on the one without key escrow
which implies the master key forward secrecy). Their protocols were the first ones that adopt key extraction algorithm introduced by Sakai and Kasahara (2003), where the
private key of the user is obtained by multiplication of the Our contributions. Using the above strategy, in this painverse of the sum of the master key and a random value per we propose two improved protocols from MB-2. In
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the first protocol, we choose an extra random value to
construct the DH key to capture the master key forward
secrecy. This protocol can achieve all basic security requirements. The security is reduced to a gap assumption.
However, a powerful adversary can mount the weak manin-the-middle attack on this protocol if they have the ability to obtain some session secrets (that is why we call it
“weak man-in-the-middle attack”). Therefore we give another enhanced protocol which can resist this kind of attack by introducing a hash function. Another extra fruit
of bringing in this hash function is that the security of the
protocol is reduced to the computational assumption. We
outline our contributions as follows.

2.1

Bilinear Pairing and Security Assumptions

Most of the known authenticated key exchange protocols
which are more widely used in practice are based on bilinear pairings. Here we briefly review some basic facts
of pairings. The notations will be used in the following
sections.
Definition 1. Let G1 is an additive group of prime order
q and GT a multiplicative group of the same order. Let
P1 denote a generator of G1 . An admissible pairing is a
bilinear map ê : G1 × G1 → GT which has the following
properties:
1. Bilinear: given Q, R ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Zq∗ , we have
ê(aQ, bR) = ê(Q, R)ab .

1. We analyze Xie’s protocol to explain why signature
is undesirable to fix MB-1 and fails to capture the
master key forward secrecy.

2. Non-degenerate: ê(P1 , P1 ) 6= 1GT .
3. Computable: ê is efficiently computable.
Remark 1. Usually, the map ê can be derived from either
the Weil or Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a finite
field. In practice, the groups, pairings and other parameters should be selected carefully for security and efficiency.
Refer Chen et al. (2007) for more details.

2. We present two protocols by improving the MB-2 protocol so that they can capture all of the basic security
properties, especially the master key forward secrecy.
Our first protocol has the comparable computational
performance to the original MB protocol in terms of
pairing computation, while our second protocol has
the stronger security.

Remark 2. There are two kinds of bilinear pairings: symmetric pairing and asymmetric pairing. If the points in the
pairing come from different groups, say (Q, R) ∈ G1 × G2
where G2 is also an additive group of prime order q and P2
is a generator of G2 , then we say this pairing is an asymmetric pairing. Correspondingly, we have ê(P1 , P2 ) 6= 1GT .
Usually, there exists an efficient algorithm ψ which maps
a point in G2 to a point in G1 . In this paper, both of the
two schemes are based on asymmetric pairing.

3. We reduce the security of the first protocol to a gap
assumption and the security of the second protocol to
the computational assumption by introducing a hash
function which is used to resist the weak man-in-themiddle attack. We prove the master key forward secrecy of the second protocol in the random oracle, by
assuming the computational Diffie Hellman assumption is hard.

In the following, we describe some assumptions which
are related to the security of our schemes.
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption: For
a, b ∈R Z∗q and some values of i, j, k ∈ {1, 2}, given (aPi ,
bPj ), computing abPk is hard.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we describe the preliminaries including bilinear pairing
and the security model. In Section 3, we analyze Xie’s protocol to explain why signature cannot capture the master
key forward security in an identity-based key agreement
protocols. In Section 4, we present our first protocol and
provide a detailed discussion. In Section 5, we introduce
the improved protocol which can resist the weak man-inthe-middle attack and give a comparison with other related protocols in terms of security properties, the cost of
computation and communication. In Section 6, we present
two theorems to demonstrate that our schemes are semantically secure and possess the master key forward secrecy.
In Section 7, we conclude the paper.

Bilinear Collision Attack Assumption (k-BCAA1 Cheng
and Chen (2007)): For an integer k, and x ∈R Z∗q , P2 ∈ G2 ,
P1 = ψ(P2 ), ê : G1 × G2 → GT , given
(P1 , P2 , xP2 , h0 , (h1 ,

where hi ∈R Z∗q and are different from each other for 0 ≤
1

i ≤ k, computing ê(P1 , P2 ) x+h0 is hard.
Gap Bilinear Collision Attack Assumption (k-GBCAA1
Cheng and Chen (2007)): For an integer k, and x ∈R Z∗q ,
P2 ∈ G2 , P1 = ψ(P2 ) ∈ G1 , ê : G1 × G2 → GT , given
(P1 , P2 , xP2 , h0 , (h1 ,
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of a key exchange protocol with master key forward se- 1 if ê(P1 , P
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crecy.
ê(P1 , P2 ) x+h0 is hard.
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2.2

Security Models

In this work, we use the concatenation of the messages
in a session to define the session ID, thus to define the
In this paper, we adopt the security model proposed by matching conversation, i.e., two oracles Πs and Πt have
i,j
j,i
Bellare and Rogaway (1993) and extended to public key a matching conversation to each other if both of them have
construction by Blake-Wilson et al. (1997) to test the se- the same session ID.
curity strength of a protocol.
Now we are ready to give the definition of a secure auThe model includes a set of parties and each party in- thenticated key agreement protocol.
volved in a session is modeled by an oracle. An oracle
Πsi,j denotes an instance of a party i involved with a part- Definition 3. Protocol Π is a secure authenticated key
ner party j in a session s where the instance of the party agreement protocol, if:
j is Πtj,i for some t. These parties can not communicate
directly; instead they only communicate with each other
• In the presence of the benign adversary (who faithfully
via an adversary. An adversary can access the oracle by
relays messages between parties), on Πsi,j and Πtj,i ,
issuing some specified queries as follows.
both oracles always accept holding the same session
key and this key is distributed uniformly at random
Send(Πsi,j , m): This query models an active attack.
on session key space;
Πsi,j executes the protocol and responds with an outgoing message x or a decision to indicate accepting or
• For every probability polynomial time(PPT) adversary
rejecting the session. If the oracle Πsi,j does not exist,
C, AdvC (k) is negligible.
it will be created. Note that if m = λ, then the oracle
is generated as an initiator; otherwise as a responder.
As mentioned in Chen et al. (2007), if a protocol is
proved to be secure with respect to the above definition,
Reveal(Πsi,j ): Πsi,j returns the session key as its re- then it achieves implicit mutual key authentication and
sponse if the oracle accepts. Otherwise, it returns ⊥. the basic security properties, i.e., known session key seSuch an oracle is called opened.
curity, key-compromise impersonation resilience and unknown key-share resilience. However, this security model
Corrupt(i): The party i responds with its private key. does not cover forward secrecy property. Here, we adopt
the definition of Chen et al. (2007) to define the master
Test(Πsi,j ): At some point, the adversary can make a
key forward secrecy as follows:
Test query to a fresh oracle Πsi,j . Πsi,j , as a challenger,
randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1} and responds with the Definition 4. A protocol is said to have master key forreal agreed session key, if b = 0; otherwise it returns ward secrecy if any PPT adversary wins the game with
a random sample generated according to the distribu- negligible advantage when it chooses an unopened chaltion of the session key.
lenger Πs which has a matching conversation to another
i,j

unopened Πtj,i and both oracles accepted and the master key
is disclosed. The disclosure of the master key may happen
at any time of the game.

The security of a protocol is defined using the two-phases
game G played between a malicious adversary C and a collection of oracles. At the first stage, C is able to send
the above first three oracle queries at will. Then, at some
point, C will choose a fresh session Πsi,j on which to be
tested and send a Test query to the fresh oracle associated with the test session. After this point, the adversary
can continue querying the oracles but can not reveal the
test oracle or its partner, and cannot corrupt the entity j.
Eventually, C terminates the game simulation and outputs
a bit b0 for b. we say C wins if the adversary guesses the
correct b.
Define the advantage of C as:

As pointed out by Chen et al. (2007), the definition
above is a weaker notion since the adversary is required
to be benign in the test session and with the knowledge
of the master key to distinguish the session key from a
random sample to win the game.
Remark 3. Since the master key forward secrecy implies
perfect forward secrecy, we can say a protocol also has perfect forward secrecy if we can prove that the protocol has
master key forward secrecy.

AdvC (k) = | 2 Pr[b0 = b] − 1 |,
3

where k is a security parameter. The fresh oracle in the
game is defined as follows.

Revisit Xie’s Repair on MB-1

In this section, Xie (2005) is analyzed to explain why signature cannot be used in identity-based key agreement protocols to achieve the master key forward secrecy. Although
this protocol has not been published in a refereed conference or journal, our analysis will show the necessity of our
protocols.

Definition 2. (Fresh oracle Cheng et al. (2004)) An oracle Πsi,j is called fresh if (1) Πsi,j has accepted; (2) Πsi,j
is unopened; (3) j 6= i is not corrupted; (4) there is no
opened oracle Πtj,i , which has had a matching conversation
to Πsi,j .
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3.1

• C computes dA and dB , then computes

Xie’s Fix with Signature

In Xie (2005), the MB-1 protocol was modified with a signature from the idea of Reddy and Nalla (2002). Suppose
two principals A and B are to agree on a session key. The
scheme consists of three algorithms: Setup, Extract and
Key Agreement. The first two are the same as those in the
MB-1 protocol, so the symbols here follow those in the MB1
P2
1 protocol. The private key is dIdent = s+H1 (ID
Ident )
where s is the master key of the KGC, Ident = {A, B}
and H1 is a hash function from the user identity space
to Z∗q . As MB-1 protocol, it is important that the discrete logarithm between ψ(P1 ) and P2 is unknown. Let
QIdent = (s + H1 (IDIdent ))P1 , the Key Agreement stage
is as follows.
To establish a shared session key, A and B respectively
and randomly chooses x and y from Z∗q as their respective
ephemeral key, and computes the corresponding ephemeral
public keys AKA = xQB , SA = H2 (AKA )dA + xdA and
BKA = yQA , SB = H2 (BKA )dB +ydB , where H2 is a hash
function from G1 to Z∗q . They then exchange (AKA , SA )
and (BKA , SB ) as described in Figure 1.
After the message exchange, A and B conduct the following tasks:

xP2 = (s + H1 (IDA )) · (SA − H2 (AKA )dA )
and
yP2 = (s + H1 (IDB )) · (SB − H2 (BKA )dB ).
• C computes
K = ê(xP1 , yP2 ) = ê(P1 , P2 )xy
or computes
K = ê(yP1 , xP2 ) = ê(P1 , P2 )xy .
Remark 4. In the original MB-1 protocol without key escrow, the adversary C can compute xP1 and yP1 as in the
step 1 while can not compute xP2 and yP2 . Although he
can compute ê(P1 , P2 )x and ê(P1 , P2 )y , he can not compute ê(P1 , P2 )xy due to the hardness of the computational
Diffie-Hellman assumption. However, in the fixed protocol,
C can compute the useful information, i.e., xP2 and yP2 ,
from the signature. Therefore, he can compute the final
session secret key.

• Having received (BKA , SB ), A verifies

Remark 5. Although the modified protocol can resist the
key-compromise impersonate attack, it does not capture the
master key forward secrecy since the adversary can obtain
some useful information from the signature, and the computational cost is more expensive than the original one because of the signature.

ê(QB , SB ) = ê(H2 (BKA )P1 , P2 ) · ê(BKA , dA ).
If the equation holds, then A computes
KAB = ê(BKA , dA )x .
• B verifies
ê(QA , SA ) = ê(H2 (AKA )P1 , P2 ) · ê(AKA , dB ).
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Our First Protocol with Master Key Forward Security

If the equation holds, then B computes
In this section, we present our improved MB protocol.

KBA = ê(AKA , dB )y .

As the result of executing the protocol, A and B can com- 4.1 The Scheme
pute the common session secret key as ê(P1 , P2 )xy .
As all other identity-based systems, we assume the existence of a trusted Key Generation Center (KGC) that is
3.2 Analysis
responsible for the creation and secure distribution of users
It was claimed that the repaired protocol resists the key- private keys.
compromise impersonate attack. In the following, we show
how an adversary C who knows the master key computes
the final session secret key using the signature in the absence of a computable group isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1
mapping P2 to P1 .

Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter k as its
input and conducts the following steps:
• Generate a prime q, and a bilinear pairing ê : G1 ×
G2 → GT , where G1 , G2 and GT are all cycle
subgroups of order q. Then, choose two generators
P1 ∈ G∗1 and P2 ∈ G∗2 randomly so that P1 = ψ(P2 ).

• C computes
xP1 = (s + H1 (IDB ))−1 · AKA

• Choose a value s ∈ Z∗q and compute Ppub = sP1 .

yP1 = (s + H1 (IDA ))−1 · BKA .

• Choose two cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗
→ Z∗q , H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n for some n.

and

5

The KGC publics params= hq, G1 , G2 , GT , ê,P1 , P2 ,
ψ, Ppub , H1 , H2 i as the system parameters, and keeps s as
his own secret master key. The parameters are distributed
to the users of the system through a secure authenticated
channel.

We can easily observe the master key forward security in
our protocol. Given a malicious adversary C who owns the
master key s, C can compute x1 P1 = T11 ·(s+H1 (IDB ))−1
and y1 P1 = T21 · (s + H1 (IDA ))−1 . He can compute
ê(P1 , P2 )x1 +y1 = ê(x1 P1 , P2 ) · ê(y1 P1 , P2 ). Although C
knows x2 P2 and y2 P2 , he can not compute the second
Extract: The KGC takes as input params, master key,
session secret x2 y2 P2 due to the hardness of the compuand an arbitrary IDIdent ∈ {0, 1}∗ , generates the private
tational Diffie-Hellman assumption. Therefore, C can not
1
P2 and sends it to the user.
key dIdent = s+H1 (ID
Ident )
obtain the final shared session secret key.
Suppose two participants A and B intend to agree on
In our scheme, we add a Diffie-Hellman exchange key to
a session key. Let QIdent = (s + H1 (IDIdent ))P1 where capture the master key forward security. It is well known
Ident = {A, B}.
that the original Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is
Key Agreement: To establish a shared session key, A vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack due to its lack
and B respectively choose x1 , x2 and y1 , y2 from Z∗q as their of mutual authentication. In our above scheme, there exrespective ephemeral key, and computes the corresponding ists the similar but less serious problem. More precisely,
ephemeral public keys T11 = x1 QB , T12 = x2 P2 and T21 = each message flow is consisted of two messages. The first
y1 QA , T22 = y2 P2 . They then exchange T1 = T11 kT12 and message has some property of implicit authentication since
it bands a random ephemeral private key with a public key
T2 = T21 kT22 as described in Figure 2.
of the party with whom the sender intends to communiAfter the message exchange,
cate. Only the party who has the corresponding private
• A computes the shared secrets
key can obtain the ephemeral private key and use it to
compute the session secret. However, there is no guarantee
KAB1 = ê(T21 , dA ) · ê(P1 , P2 )x1
in the second message. Therefore, if a malicious adversary
C has some ability to obtain the first session secret, then
and
he can mount the man-in-the-middle attack successfully.
KAB2 = x2 · T22 .
• C blocks the message flows T1 = x1 QB kx2 P2 and T2 =
• B computes
y1 QA ky2 P2 between two users, and selects a random
value z and computes zP2 , then sends x1 QB and zP2
KBA1 = ê(T11 , dB ) · ê(P1 , P2 )y1
to B and y1 QA and zP2 to A.
and

• C manages to obtain the first session secret by some
means. This is possible if the attacker is powerful, for
example, he is a powerful server.

KBA2 = y2 · T12 .
Protocol Correctness: we can easily verify the correctness:
KAB1

• C computes the second session secret with A and B as
x2 zP2 and y2 zP2 , respectively.

= ê(T21 , dA ) · ê(P1 , P2 )x1

Thus, the session secrets between A and C are KAC,1 and
KAC,2 = x2 zP2 , and the session secrets between B and C
= ê(P1 , P2 )y1 · ê(P1 , P2 )x1
are KBC1 and KBC2 = y2 zP2 . Note that KAC1 = KBC1 =
KAB1 . Therefore, at the end of the execution, A and B
= ê(P1 , P2 )x1 +y1 ,
thought they have established a shared secret key, while
KAB2 = x2 · T22
actually, they have shared the different keys with C. Thus,
= x2 y2 P2 .
if A wants to send a ciphertext which is encrypted by the
established
shared session key to B, then B can not obtain
x1 +y1
Similarly, we can obtain KBA1 = ê(P1 , P2 )
and
the
right
plaintext.
However, C can read the message using
KBA2 = x2 y2 P2 . Thus, the two secret keys computed by A
this
shared
session
key.
A and B will not aware of this.
and B are equal, i.e., A and B have successfully established
The
other
difference
between
this scheme and the MB-2
the shared key K1 = KAB1 = KBA1 and K2 = KAB2 =
is
that
in
our
scheme,
each
user
chooses
two random values
KBA2 after running an instance of the protocol. The final
as
the
ephemeral
private
keys
so
that
we
can reduce the seshared session key is then sk = H2 (AkBkT1 kT2 kK1 kK2 ),
curity
of
the
scheme
to
the
gap
computational
assumption.
∗
n
where H2 : {0, 1} → {0, 1} .
If we use one random value to construct the messages, we
find it is hard to deal with the Send query perfectly.
4.2 Discussion
= ê(y1 QA , dA ) · ê(P1 , P2 )x1

In this protocol, we utilize an asymmetric pairing to compute the first session secret, and add a DH exchange key to 5 Our Second Scheme with Stronger Security
capture the master key forward security. It is known that
the computational cost on asymmetric pairing is efficient To strengthen the security of our first protocol, we manage
to bind the two messages together so that the powerful
than that of the symmetric pairing.
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adversary can not modify the second message.
5.1

5.2

We explain why we construct x1 H2 (x2 P2 ) as user A’s third
message and how this message is used to resist the weak
man-in-the middle attack on the first protocol.
The main purpose of introducing the third message is
to make sure that the second message was not modified
during the protocol. There are two methods which are
usually used to resist the man-in-the-middle attack: one
is based on the hash function and the other relies on a
signature. We have showed that signature is undesirable
for an identity-based key agreement protocol with master
key forward secrecy in Section 3. We now utilize the hash
function value H2 (x2 P2 ) to construct the third message.
However, a malicious adversary would create a new message pair (zP2 , H2 (zP2 )) by himself. Therefore, this hash
value should be bound with some secret value which cannot be computed by the adversary. Here we choose the
secret value x1 since an adversary can not compute x1 or
x1 P1 from x1 QB ; thus he can not create forge a message
pair. The reason we do not choose x2 is that the adversary
can still forge a message pair (zP2 , zH2 (zP2 )) which passes
the check without being noticed! Moreover, to our surprise,
the extra part can not only resist weak man-in-the-middle
attack, but also can be used to construct a build-in function which helps the simulator to reduce the security of the
protocol to a computational assumption instead of a gap
assumption.
In the following, we explain how the extra message is
used to resist the above attack. As a matter of fact, in the
message flow T1 = (T11 , T12 , T13 ), one part or two parts of
them cannot be modified without the other part(s) unmodified. So the third part and the check equations guarantee
the integrity of the message.

The Scheme

The scheme of Setup and Extract are the same as the
first protocol except thet we need three cryptographic
hash functions: H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , H2 : G2 → G1 and
H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n for some n. We introduce another
message in the Key Agreement stage to prevent the adversary from modifying message sent by the users.
Key Agreement: To establish a shared session key, A
and B respectively chooses x1 , x2 and y1 , y2 from Z∗q
as their ephemeral key, and computes the corresponding ephemeral public keys T11 = x1 QB , T12 = x2 P2 ,
T13 = x1 H2 (x2 P2 ) and T21 = y1 QA , T22 = y2 P2 and T23 =
y1 H2 (y2 P2 ). They then exchange T1 = (T11 , T12 , T13 ) and
T2 = (T21 , T22 , T23 ) as described in Figure 3.
After the message exchange,
• A and B check if the equation
ê(T21 , H2 (T22 )) = ê(QA , T23 )
and
ê(T11 , H2 (T12 )) = ê(QB , T13 )
hold.
If not, abort the session.
• A computes the shared secrets
KAB1 = ê(T21 , dA ) · ê(P1 , P2 )x1
and
KAB2 = x2 · T22 .
• B computes the shared secrets

• C
intercepts the message flows T1
=
(x1 QB , x2 P2 , x1 H2 (x2 P2 )) and T2
=
(y1 QA ,
y2 P2 , y1 H2 (y2 P2 )) between the two users, and
selects a random value z and computes zP2 , then
0
0
sends (x1 QB , zP2 , T13
) to B, where T13
6= x1 H2 (zP2 )
0
since C does not know x1 and sends (y1 QA , zP2 , T23
)
0
to A, where T23
6= y1 H2 (zP2 ).

KBA1 = ê(T11 , dB ) · ê(P1 , P2 )y1
and
KBA2 = y2 · T12 .
Protocol Correctness: we can easily verify the following
equations:
KAB1

= ê(T21 , dA ) · ê(P1 , P2 )x1
= ê(y1 QA , dA ) · ê(P1 , P2 )

Discussion

• A and B check if the equations
x1

ê(T21 , H2 (T22 )) = ê(QA , T23 )

= ê(P1 , P2 )y1 · ê(P1 , P2 )x1
= ê(P1 , P2 )x1 +y1 ,
KAB2

and
ê(T11 , H2 (T12 )) = ê(QB , T13 )

= x2 · T22
= x2 · (y2 P2 )

hold or not.

= x2 y2 P2 .

It is easy to verify that both of the equations do not
hold. According to the protocol specification, the protocol is aborted.

Similarly, we can obtain KBA1 = ê(P1 , P2 )x1 +y1 and
KBA2 = x2 y2 P2 . Thus, two secret keys computed by
A and B are equal, i.e., A and B have successfully established the shared secrets K1 = KAB1 = KBA1 and
K2 = KAB2 = KBA2 after running an instance of the
protocol. The final shared secret session key is then sk =
H3 (AkBkT1 kT2 kK1 kK2 ), where H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n .

5.3

Efficiency Analysis and Comparison

We compare our schemes with the original MB protocol
and all of its variants, in terms of the security properties,
security reduction and computation cost. The comparison
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is outlined in Table 1 where the second column lists all
the basic security attributes: known-key secrecy (k-ks),
forward secrecy (fs), key compromise impersonate (kci),
and unknown-key share (uks). We use X to indicate that
the property is proved to be satisfied and × otherwise, and
use - to denote that there is no any acceptable proof. In the
last column, P denotes Pairing, M denotes multiplication
in Gi , where i = {1, 2} and E denotes exponentiation in
GT .
According to Table 1, every scheme has some weakness,
except our two schemes which satisfies all basic security
properties. In security reduction, only the security of eMB and our second scheme is reduced to a computational
assumption.
Considering the computational cost, all of the schemes
need only one pairing to compute the final session secret.
The e-MB scheme and our second scheme need two more
pairings to check the equation for each user. Note that
this equation actually is the build-in function which helps
the simulator to compute the session secret and reduce the
security to the computational assumption. Although our
second scheme needs an additional hash function, the computational cost of this kind of hash function is negligible.

6

Proof: Our proof follows the same method used in Chen
et al. (2007). Session ID is defined as a concatenation of
T1 k T2 . We focus on how to construct an algorithm B
using the adversary A to solve a (q1 -1)-BCAA1 problem
with non-negligible probability.
Given an instance of the (q1 -1)-BCAA1 problem
hG1 , G2 , GT , ê, q, ψ, (P1 , P2 , sP2 , h0 ,
(h1 ,

1
1
P2 ), · · · , (hq1 −1 ,
P2 ))i,
h1 + s
hq1 −1 + s

where hi ∈R Z∗q for 0 ≤ i ≤ q1 − 1, ê is a bilinear pairing: ê : G1 × G2 → GT , the algorithm
1
B’s task is computing ê(P1 , P2 ) h0 +s . B simulates the
Setup algorithm by firstly computing Ppub = ψ(sP2 ) =
sP1 ∈ G∗1 where s is the master key which it does
not know, and then sending the system parameters
(G1 , G2 , GT , ê, q, ψ, P1 , P2 , Ppub , H1 , H2 , H3 ) to A. The
hash functions H1 , H2 and H3 are random oracles controlled by B.
Algorithm B randomly chooses I ∈R {1, · · · q1 } and
J ∈R {1, · · · , q0 } and begins its simulation. Here we
should note that the notation Πsi,j is the s-th oracle among
all the created oracles. Algorithm B answers the queries
which are asked by adversary A in arbitrary order as follows.

Security analysis

H1 (IDi ) queries: Algorithm B maintains an initially empty
list H1list with entries of the form (IDi , hi , di ). When A
queries the oracle H1 at a point IDi , B responds to the
query in the follows way:

The semantic security of the first scheme can be reduced
to the gap assumption in a sightly different model from the
model in this paper. The semantic security of the second
scheme can be reduced to the computational assumption.
The master key forward secrecy of both schemes can be
reduced to the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Due to the similarity in the reductions, we only present
the detailed proof of the second scheme.
The key idea for the proof is as follows. We try to construct an algorithm B using the adversary A that attacks
the second scheme to solve a (q1 -1)-BCAA1 problem with
non-negligible probability. More precisely, when A makes
the different queries according to the security model in Section 2.2, B should simulate different oracles and respond
to A without being noticed the difference between the simulation and the real world. After the interaction between
A and B, B should give a solution to the (q1 -1)-BCAA1
problem with non-negligible probability.

If IDi already appears on the H1list in a tuple
(IDi , hi , di ), then B responds with H1 (IDi ) = hi .
Otherwise, if IDi is the I-th unique identifier query,
then B stores (IDi , h0 , ⊥) into the tuple list and responds with H1 (IDi ) = h0 .
Otherwise, B randomly selects hi (i > 0) from the (q1 1)-BCAA1 instance which has not been chosen by B
and inserts (IDi , hi , hi1+s P2 ) into the tuple list. B
responds with H1 (IDi ) = hi .
H2 (Si ) queries: Algorithm B maintains an initially empty
list H2list with entries of the form (St , mt , Rt , wt ). B responds to the query in the follows way:

Theorem 1. If H1 , H2 and H3 are random oracles and the
• If a tuple (Si , mi , Ri , wi ) has already appeared on the
(q1 -1)-BCAA1 assumption holds, then our second scheme
H2list , then B responds with Ri .
is a secure key agreement protocol. In particular, suppose
A is an adversary that attacks the second scheme in the
• Otherwise, B randomly selects mi (i > 0) ∈R Zq∗
random oracle model with non-negligible probability n(k)
and inserts (Si , mi , mi P1 , ⊥) into the tuple list. B
and makes at most q1 , q3 queries to H1 and H3 , respecresponds with mi P1 .
tively, and creates at most qo oracles. Then there exists
t
t
t
t
B maintains an
an algorithm B to solve the (q1 -1)-BCAA1 problem with H3 (IDi , IDj , Ti , Tj , K1 , K2 ) queries:
list
initially empty list H3
with entries of the form
advantage
(IDi , IDj , Tit , Tjt , K1t , K2t , ζ t ) which is indexed by
1
(q −1)−BCAA1
(IDi , IDj , Tit , Tjt , K1t , K2t ).
B responds to the query
n(k).
AdvB 1
(k) ≥
q1 · q3 · q0
in the following way.
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• If a tuple indexed by (IDi , IDj , Tit , Tjt , K1t , K2t ) is on
the list, then B responds with ζ t .

– If (M1 , M2 , M3 ) is not the second message on the
transcript,
t
∗ If di 6= ⊥, randomly sample rij,1
∈ Z∗q and
∗
t
rij,2 ∈ Zq .
t
∗ Otherwise, randomly sample rij,1
∈ Z∗q and
t
∗
t
t
rij,2 ∈ Zq , compute rij,1 Qi , rij,2 P2 so that
they have not been shown on H3list as a part
of some Ti if Πti,j is the initiator or Tj otherwise.

• Otherwise, B chooses a random string ζ t ∈ {0, 1}n
and inserts a new tuple (IDi , IDj , Tit , Tjt , K1t ,K2t , ζ t )
into the list H3list and returns ζ t .
Corrupt(IDi ): B goes through list H1list . If IDi is not on
the list, B queries H1 (IDi ). B checks the value of di : if
di 6=⊥, then B responds with di ; otherwise, B aborts the
game (Event 1).

t
– If (M1 , M2 , M3 ) = λ, compute Ti1 = rij,1
Qj ,
t
t
Ti2 = rij,2 P2 and Ti3 = rij,1 H2 (Ti2 ), Then respond with (Ti1 , Ti2 , Ti3 ).

Send(Πti,j , (M1 , M2 , M3 )): B maintains a list for each orat
t
t
t
cle of the form (Πti,j , tranti,j ,rij,1
,rij,2
, Kij,1
,SKi,j
) where
t
t
t
trani,j is the transcript of the oracle so far; rij,1 , rij,2
are
the random integers used by the oracle to generate the
t
t
are set ⊥ initially. This list is
and SKi,j
messages; Ki,j
updated in other queries as well. B proceeds in the following way:

– Otherwise, check if the equation ê(M1 , R) =
ê(Qi , M3 ). If the equation does not hold, reject
the session. Otherwise,
∗ If Tj = (M1 , M2 , M3 ) is the first message of
t
the session, compute Ti1 = rij,1
Qj , Ti2 =
t
t
rij,2 P2 and Ti3 = rij,1 H2 (Ti2 ), then respond
t
with Ti = (Ti1 , Ti2 , Ti3 ). Compute Ki,j
as
below and accept the session. If di 6= ⊥,
compute

• Query Qi = H1 (IDi )P1 +sP1 , Qj = H1 (IDj )P1 +sP1
and R = H2 (M2 ).
• B looks through the list H1list . If IDi is not on the list,
B queries H1 (IDi ). After that, B checks the value of
t.

t

t
Kij,1
= ê(M1 , di ) · ê(P1 , P2 )rij,1

and
• If t = J, B checks the value of dj and gives the different response depending on it as below.

t
t
Kij,2
= rij,2
· M2

where M1 , M2 are a part of the incoming
t
t
messages and rij,1
, rij,2
are selected rant
domly by oracle Πi,j . If di = ⊥, compute

– If dj 6=⊥, B aborts the game (Event 2).
– Otherwise,
∗ If (M1 , M2 , M3 ) is not the last message, randomly sample x ∈ Z∗q such that xP1 is not
shown on the list of H2list as some St , and
then randomly sample wt ∈ Z∗q and insert
the tuple (xP1 , ⊥, wt · (h0 + s)P1 , wt ) into
H2list .
∗ If (M1 , M2 , M3 ) = λ, compute Ti1 =
xP1 = rQj , Ti2 = yP2 and Ti3 =
rH2 (Ti2 ) = h0x+s · (wt · (h0 + s)P1 ) =
xwt P1 , where r = h0x+s which is unknown
to the simulator. Obviously the equation
ê(Ti1 , H2 (Ti2 )) = ê(Qj , Ti3 ) holds. Then respond with (Ti1 , Ti2 , Ti3 ).
∗ If (M1 , M2 , M3 ) is the first message of the
session, then check if ê(M1 , R) = ê(Qi , M3 )
holds or not. If so, compute Ti1 = xP1 =
rQj , Ti2 = yP2 and Ti3 = rH2 (Ti2 ) =
x
h0 +s · (wt · (h0 + s)P1 ) = xwt P1 , where
r = h0x+s is unknown to the simulator. Then
respond with (Ti1 , Ti2 , Ti3 ) and accept the
session. Otherwise, reject the session.
∗ If (M1 , M2 , M3 ) is the last message of the
session, then check if ê(M1 , R) = ê(Qi , M3 )
holds or not. If so, do nothing but accept
the session. Otherwise, reject the session.

t
Kij,1

t

= ê(M1 , di ) · ê(P1 , P2 )rij,1
t
1
P2 ) · ê(P1 , P2 )rij,1 ,
= ê(M1 ,
s + h0

and
t
t
Kij,2
= rij,2
· M2

where M1 , M2 are the incoming messages
t
t
and rij,1
, rij,2
are selected randomly by orat
cle Πi,j .
1
is unknown to the simulator, it
Since s+h
0
checks the value of the first received message
M1 , and does as follows:
1
If M1 6= xP1 , then by using ê(M1 , s+h
P2 ) =
0
1
ê(P1 , mt M3 ) followed from the equation
ê(M1 , R) = ê(Qi , M3 ), where H2 (M2 ) =
R = mt P2 (find mt in the H2list ), compute
t
Ki,j
= ê(P1 ,

t
1
M3 ) · ê(P1 , P2 )rij,1
mt

If M1 = xP1 , do nothing.
t
t
∗ If Kij,1
and Kij,2
are computed, then set
t
t
t
SKi,j = H3 (IDi , IDj , Ti , Tj , Kij,1
, Kij,2
)
t
if party i is the initiator, or SKi,j =
t
t
H3 (IDj , IDi , Tj , Ti , Kij,1
, Kij,2
) otherwise.
t
t
If Kij,1 and Kij,1 are not computed, then
t
randomly sample SKi,j
.

• If t 6= J, B proceeds the protocol as follows.
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Reveal(Πti,j ): B answers the queries as follows:

Let F be the event that B did not abort during the game.
Then, we get

• If oracle Πti,j has not accepted, then respond with ⊥.

Pr[F]

• If t = J or if the J-th oracle has been generated as
ΠJa,b and IDa = IDj , IDb = IDi and two oracles have
the same session ID, then abort the game (Event 3).

=
=

Pr[¬F1 ∧ ¬F2 ∧ ¬F3 ∧ ¬F4 ]
1 1
Pr[¬F2 ∧ ¬F4 ] ≥
· .
q1 qo

Claim 2. Let G be the event that A noticed the inconsistence between the simulation and the real world when B
did not abort the simulation. Then Event G implies that
Test(Πti,j ): If t 6= J or (t = J but) there is an oracle the probability B solves the (q -1)-BCAA1 problem is non1
Πsj,i which has the same session ID as Πti,j that has been negligible.
revealed, B aborts the game (Event 4). Otherwise, B reProof: B gives the satisfying response to most of the orasponds to A a random number ζ ∈ {0, 1}n .
cles by following the protocol specification honestly, except
After A finishes the queries, it returns its guess. Then
for the one Πtj,u whose private key is ⊥ and the incomB proceeds with the following steps:
ing message (M1 , M2 , M3 ) is from the tested oracle where
• Compute D = ê(M1 , di ), where M1 is the first part M1 = xP1 . Note that the transcripts are one part of the
of the received messages, di is found from H1list corre- input to H3 which is modelled as the random oracle to
compute the session keys. If there is some difference besponding to IDi of ΠJi,j . Note that
tween the reveal query on Πtj,u and a query on H3 , it must
x
J
have queried H3 with Πtj,u such that
Ki,j
= ê(M1 , di ) · ê(P1 , P2 ) h0 +s
t
• Return SKi,j
.

=

1

D · (ê(P1 , P2 ) h0 +s )x .

t
Kju,1

t

= ê(M1 , dj ) · ê(P1 , P2 )rju,1
t

1

= ê(P1 , P2 )rju,1 · (ê(P1 , P2 ) h0 +s )x .

• B randomly samples Kl,1 from the H3list , and returns
1
(Kl,1 /D) x as the response to the (q1 -1)-BCAA1 challenge.

t
If A can distinguish the session key Kju,1
in the simulation
t

Claim 1. During the simulation, the probability that B did
not abort the game is non-negligible.

1

from the real world, then B can return (Kl /ê(P1 , P2 )rju,1 ) x
as the response to the (q1 -1)-BCAA1 challenge with probability q1 ·q10 ·q3 , where Kl is a random value choosing from
H3 by B. This completes the proof.

Proof: We now evaluate the probability that B did not
Claim 3. Let H be the event that K1 = ê(M1 , di ) ·
x
abort during the game, i.e., Events 1 - 4 did not happen. B
ê(P1 , P2 ) h0 +s was not queried on H3 conditioned on ¬G,
aborts the game only when at least one of following events
then
happens:
Pr[¬H] ≥ n(k).
1. Event 1, denoted as F1 : A corrupted party i whose Proof: Similar to the analysis of Cheng and Chen (2007),
private key is represented by ⊥, i.e., A made a query we have
to party i to get its private key if it chose Πuj,i as
1
the fresh oracle, which is disallowed according to the
Pr[A wins| H] ≤ .
definition of the fresh oracle;
2
Thus
2. Event 2, denoted as F2 : A can not impersonate party
i whose private key is represented by ⊥ in the u-th
session;
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|¬H] · Pr[¬H]
+ Pr[A wins|H] · Pr[H]

3. Event 3, denoted as F3 : A revealed the J-th oracle
or its partner oracle, which is against the definition of
the fresh oracle,
4. Event 4, denoted as F4 : A did not choose the J-th
oracle as the challenge fresh oracle or the parter of
the fresh oracle has been revealed, which made the
test query can not work.

≤ Pr[A wins|¬H] · Pr[¬H] + Pr[A wins|H]
1
1
≤
Pr[¬H] +
2
2
and
Pr[A wins]

=

Pr[A wins|¬H] · Pr[¬H]
+ Pr[A wins|H] · Pr[H]

According to the rules of the game, we have
≥

¬F4 ∧ ¬F2 → ¬F1 ,

=
and
¬F4 → ¬F3 .

So we have
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Pr[A wins|H] · Pr[H]
1 1
− Pr[¬H]
2 2

Pr[¬H] ≥ 2| Pr[A wins − 12 ]| = n(k).
Thus, the claim is correct.
Let I be the event that B found the correct Kl . Then
combining all of the above results, we have
Pr[B wins]

=

≥
≥

Pr[B wins|¬H] · P r[¬H]
+ Pr[B wins|H] · Pr[H]
1
1
n(k) Pr[¬H] +
Pr[H]
q1 · qo · q3
q1 · qo · q3
1
n(k),
q1 · qo · q3

which contradicts to the hardness of the (q1 -1)-BCAA1
problem. This completes the security analysis of the protocol.


Remark 6. Since our protocol is proved to be secure in the
security model defined by Blake-Wilson et al. (1997) and
Cheng et al. (2004), it achieves implicit mutual key authentication and the basic security properties, i.e., known session key security, key-compromise impersonation resilience
and unknown key-share resilience.
Theorem 2. Our second scheme captures the master key
forward secrecy provided the CDH assumption is sound
and H3 is modelled as random oracle. Specifically, suppose A wins the game with non-negligible advantage n(k),
then there exists a polynomial-time algorithm B to solve
the CDH problem with advantage
1
n(k).
2
Proof: According to the protocol specification, the first
item given in Definition 3 is satisfied if A is a benign adversary. We focus on Item 2 in Definition 3 and show how
to construct an algorithm B using the adversary A to solve
a CDH problem with non-negligible probability.
Given a set of pairing parameters and a CDH problem
instance (aP2 , bP2 ), we show how to construct an algorithm B to solve the CDH problem by using A. Algorithm
B simulates the Setup algorithm as follows, B randomly
samples s ∈ Z∗q and computes Ppub = sP1 = ψ(sP2 ) ∈ G1
which is the master pubic key and uses s as the master key.
The hash function H3 will be modelled as a random oracle
under the control of B, while H1 and H2 will be a cryptographic hash function. Here we need that the master secret
key s is passed to A as well, so B no longer simulates the
Corrupt query.
As in Theorem 1, we use Πsi,j as the s-th oracle among all
the oracles created during the attack. Again algorithm B
answers the following queries which are asked by adversary
A in an arbitrary order.
AdvBCDH (k) ≥

• H3 (IDi , IDj , X t , Y t , K1t , K2t ) queries: Algorithm B
maintains an initially empty list H3list with entries of
the form (IDi , IDj , X t , Y t , K1t , K2t , ht ). B responds
to the query in the following way.
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– If a tuple indexed by (IDi , IDj , X t , Y t , K1t , K2t )
is on the list, then B responds with ht .
– Otherwise, B goes through the list Λ which is
maintained in the Reveal query to find a tuple
with values (IDi , IDj , X t , Y t , K1t , Πti,j ) and proceeds as follows:
∗ Obtain Ti2 and Tj2 from X t and Y t , respectively. Check if the equality ê(Ti2 , Tj2 ) =
e(P2 , K2t ) holds. If the equality holds, then,
t
from the list Λ.
· Find the value SKi,j
· Remove
(IDi , IDj , X t , Y t , K1t , Πti,j )
from the list Λ. Put (IDi , IDj , X t , Y t ,
t
) in the list H3list and
K1t , K2t , SKi,j
t
return SKi,j . Note that Πti,j is placed
in the list Λ only when it has been
t
revealed, so SKi,j
has been sampled.
∗ Otherwise (no tuple in Λ meets the test), algorithm B chooses ht ∈ {0, 1}n randomly, inserts (IDi , IDj , X t , Y t , K1t , K2t , ht ) into the
list and returns ht .
– Otherwise, B randomly chooses ht ∈ {0, 1}n , inserts (IDi , IDj , X t , Y t , K1t , K2t , ht ) into the list
and returns ht .
Send(Πti,j , (M1 , M2 , M3 )): B maintains a list Ω
t
t
for each oracle of the form (Πti,j , tranti,j ,rij,1
, rij,2
,
t
t
t
t
Kij,1 , SKi,j , ci,j ) where trani,j is the transcript of the
t
t
oracle so far; rij,1
, rij,2
, cti,j are used for special purt
t
pose explained below, and Kij,1
and SKi,j
are set ⊥
initially. This list is updated in the Send query as well
as in the Reveal query and H3 query. B proceeds in
the following way:
– If (M1 , M2 , M3 ) is not the second message on the
transcript,
t
t
∗ Randomly sample rij,1
, rij,2
∈ Z∗q .
t
∗ Randomly flip ci,j ∈ {0, 1}.
t
t
If cti,j = 0, set Ti1 = rij,1
Qj , Ti2 = rij,2
aP2 ,
t
Ti3 = rij,1 H2 (Ti2 ),
t
t
else Ti1 = rij,1
Qj , Ti2 = rij,2
bP2 , Ti3 =
t
rij,1 H2 (Ti2 ).
If Ti2 = P2 , then responds to the CDH challenge with rt1 bP2 if cti,j = 0, or rt1 aP2
ij,2

ij,2

otherwise (Event 1).
∗ If (M1 , M2 , M3 ) 6= λ, check if the equation
ê(M1 , H2 (M2 )) = ê(Qi , M3 ) holds or not.
If does not hold, then reject the session;
otherwise, compute
t
Kij,1

= ê(M1 ,

1
P2 )
s + H1 (IDI )
t

·ê(P1 , P2 )rij,1
(Note that here the simulator cannot comt
t
t
t
pute Kij,2
= rij,2
a · M2 or Kij,2
= rij,2
b · M2
because the simulator did not know the value
of a or b) and accept the session.

– For every pair (X t , Y t , K2t ) on H3list with X t =
Ti , Y t = Tj if the tested oracle Πti,j is an initiator oracle, otherwise with X t = Tj , Y t = Ti ,
first obtain X2t = Ti2 and Y2t = Tj2 from Ti and
Tj , respectively. Check if ê(X2t , Y2t ) = ê(P2 , K2t )
holds (Ti and Tj are found in tranti,j ). If no such
K2t meets the equation, abort the game (Event
3).

∗ Return (Ti1 , Ti2 , Ti3 ).
– Otherwise, check if the equation
ê(M1 , H2 (M2 )) = ê(Qi , M3 )
holds or not.
If does not hold, then reject the session;
otherwise, compute
t
Kij,1

– Otherwise, return rt 1·ru K2t as the response to
ij,2 ji,2
the CDH challenge.

t
1
= ê(M1 ,
P2 ) · ê(P1 , P2 )rij,1
s + H1 (IDI )

and accept the session.
Reveal(Πti,j ): Algorithm B maintains a list Λ with tut
ples of the form (IDi , IDj , Xi , Yj , Kij,1
, Πti,j ). The algorithm B proceeds in the following way to respond:
– Get the tuple of oracle Πti,j from Ω.
– If Πti,j has not accepted, return ⊥.
– If the Test(Πti,j ) query has been issued and if
Πti,j = ΠJa,b or IDa = IDj and IDb = IDi and
two oracles have the same session ID, then disallow the query.
t
t
– If SKi,j
6= ⊥, return SKi,j
.

– Otherwise,
∗ Go through the list H3list to find a tut
t
ple (IDi , IDj , Ti , Tj , Kij,1
, Kij,2
, ht ) if IDi
is the initiator or a tuple (IDj , IDi ,
t
t
Tj , Ti , Kij,1
, Kij,2
, ht ) otherwise. Obtain Ti2
and Tj2 from Ti and Tj , respectively. Check
if the equation ê(Ti2 , Tj2 ) = ê(P2 , K2t ) holds
or not, where Ti and Tj are the messages of
party i and j in tranti,j .
t
∗ If such Z t is found, then return SKi,j
= ht .
t
∗ Otherwise, randomly sample SKi,j
∈
t
{0, 1}n and put (IDi , IDj , Ti , Tj , Kij,1
, Πti,j )
if IDi is the initiator or (IDj , IDi ,
t
Tj , Ti , Kij,1
, Πti,j ) into list Λ. B responds
t
t
with SKi,j
and puts SKi,j
into Ω.
Test(Πti,j ): By the rule of the game, there is a partner
oracle Πuj,i with the same session ID with Πti,j and
both should not be revealed. B proceeds as follows:

We now analyze the success probability of B. Let
F 0 , H0 and I 0 denote Event 1, Event 2 and Event 3,
respectively. Firstly we give two claims.
Claim 4. A did not notice the inconsistence between
the simulation and the real world if B did not abort
the game.
Proof: For most queries, B just correctly answers
by honestly following the protocol specification, thus
the responses to these queries are valid. The messages of the oracles are uniformly and independently
distributed in the message space as in the real attack.
To H3 queries, by making use of the random oracle
and the pairing as the decisional algorithm of DH, we
can guarantee that the response for every H3 query is
consistent with that of the reveal queries. This claim
follows.
Claim 5.
P r[¬I 0 ] ≥ n(k).
This proof is similar to the proof of Claim 3, thus we
omit the detail.
Since
Pr[¬H0 ] =

1
,
2

we have
Pr[B wins] = Pr[F 0 ∨ (¬H0 ∧ ¬I 0 )] ≥

n(k)
,
2

which contradicts to the hardness of the CDH problem. This completes the security analysis of the protocol.


Remark 7. According to the definition of the forward secrecy, if a protocol satisfies with master key forward secrecy, then it must hold perfect forward secrecy. So we
– Otherwise, without loosing generality, we assume can claim that our protocol satisfies with perfect forward
cti,j = 0 and cuj,i = 1, i.e., Ti = (Ti1 , Ti2 , Ti3 ) secrecy and master key forward secrecy.
t
t
where Ti1 = rij,1
Qj , Ti2 = rij,2
aP2 , Ti3 =
Combined with theorem 1 and theorem 2, we draw a
t
rij,1 H2 (Ti2 ) and Tj = (Tj1 , Tj2 , Tj3 ) where Tj1 =
conclusion
that the second scheme satisfies all kinds of
u
u
u
rji,1 Qi , Tj2 = rji,2 bP2 , Tj3 = rji,1 H2 (Tj2 ). B
basic
security
attributes, i.e., known session key security,
n
randomly chooses ζ ∈ {0, 1} and responds to A
forward
secrecy,
key-compromise impersonation resilience
with ζ .
and unknown key-share resilience, where forward secrecy
Once A finishes the queries, B proceeds with the fol- consists of partial forward secrecy, perfect forward secrecy
and master key forward secrecy.
lowing steps:
– Check if cti,j = cuj,i . If it is true, then abort the
game (Event 2).
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Conclusion

Choo, K-K.R. (2005) ‘Revisit of McCullagh–Barreto twoparty ID-based authenticated key agreement protocols’,
We proposed two identity-based key agreement protocols
International Journal of Network Security, No. 1(3),
and showed that these protocols hold stronger security
pp.154–160.
compared to the MB protocols. Our protocols meet all
security requirements, including the master key forward McCullagh, N. and Barreto, P.S.L.M. (2005) ‘A new twoparty identitybased authenticated key agreement’, In:
secrecy. We firstly presented a security model with masTopics in Cryptology-CT-RSA 2005, LNCS, Vol. 3376,
ter key forward secrecy. We then analyzed Xie’s protocol
pp.262-274.
to show that signature is undesirable for an identify-based
key agreement protocol with master key forward secrecy.
Shamir, A. (1984) ‘Identity-based cryptosystems and sigWe presented two enhanced indentity-based authenticated
nature schemes’, In: Advances in Cryptology-Crypto’84,
key agreement protocols inspired from MB-2 by adding an
LNCS, Vol. 196, pp.47-53.
extra DH key to obtain the master key forward secrecy. We
proved the security of our protocols, under a gap assump- Shim, K. (2003) ‘Efficient ID-based authenticated key
tion and a computational assumption, respectively. The
agreement protocol based on the Weil pairing’, Electronmaster key forward secrecy can be reduced to the compuics Letters, Vol. 39, No. 8, pp.653-654.
tational Diffie Hellman assumption using the new security
model we defined. The efficiency of the first scheme is com- Sakai, R., Ohgishi, K. and Kasahara, M. (2000) ‘Cryptosystems based on pairing’, In: Symposium on Crypparable to the original MB protocol in terms of the pairing
tography and Information Security, Okinawa, Japan.
computation. Although the second scheme is less efficient
than the first one, it achieves the strongest security.
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A

B

x ∈R Z∗q
AKA = xQB ,
SA = H2 (AKA )dA + xdA

y ∈R Z∗q
BKA = yQA ,
SB = H2 (BKA )dB + ydB
(AKA ,SA )

−−−−−−−−−→
(BKA ,SB )

←−−−−−−−−−
KAB = ê(BKA , dA )x

KBA = ê(AKA , dB )y

Figure 1: Xie’s modified protocol with signature.

A

B

x1 , x2 ∈R Z∗q
T11 = x1 QB ,
T12 = x2 P2

y1 , y2 ∈R Z∗q
T21 = y1 QA ,
T22 = y2 P2
T1 =T11 kT12

−−−−−−−−−→
T2 =T21 kT22

←−−−−−−−−−
KAB1 = ê(T21 , dA ) · ê(P1 , P2 )x1
KAB2 = x2 · T22
skA = H2 (AkBkT1 kT2 kKAB1 kKAB2 )

KBA1 = ê(T11 , dB ) · ê(P1 , P2 )y1
KBA2 = y2 · T12
skB = H2 (AkBkT1 kT2 kKBA1 kKBA2 )

Figure 2: The first protocol.

A

B

x1 , x2 ∈R Z∗q
T11 = x1 QB ,
T12 = x2 P2 ,
T13 = x1 H2 (x2 P2 )

T23

y1 , y2 ∈R Z∗q
T21 = y1 QA ,
T22 = y2 P2 ,
= y1 H2 (y2 P2 )

T1 =(T11 ,T12 ,T13 )

−−−−−−→

T2 =(T21 ,T22 ,T23 )

←−−−−−−

check ê(T21 , H2 (T22 )) = ê(QA , T23 )
KAB1 = ê(T21 , dA ) · ê(P1 , P2 )x1
KAB2 = x2 · T22
skA = H3 (AkBkT1 kT2 kKAB1 kKAB2 )

check ê(T11 , H2 (T12 )) = ê(QB , T13 )
KBA1 = ê(T11 , dB ) · ê(P1 , P2 )y1
KBA2 = y2 · T12
skB = H3 (AkBkT1 kT2 kKBA1 kKBA2 )

Figure 3: The second protocol with strengthening security.

Schemes
k-ks
MB-1 McCullagh and Barreto (2005)
MB-2 McCullagh and Barreto (2005)
MB-1+2
e-MB Chen et al. (2007)
Ours1
Ours2

X
X
X
X
X

Security Properties
fs
kci
s
d m
X X ×
×
X × ×
X
X X ×
X
X × ×
X
X X X
X
X X X
X

Reduction

Performance

k-GBCAA1
k-GBCAA1
k-BCAA1
k-GBCAA1+CDH
k-BCAA1+CDH

P + 3M
P + 2M + E
P + 2M + 2E
3P + 3M + E
P + 4M + E
3P + 5M + E

uks
X
X
X
X
X

Table 1: Comparison of the identity-based key agreement schemes in the literature. Ours1 and Ours2 denote our first
scheme and second scheme respectively.
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